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The year 2018 was characterized by parliamentary elections, held on 20 October. 
While the elections represented an important moment for Afghanistan’s democracy, 
both the run up and the aftermath were characterized by confusion and insecurity, 
with the election results still not announced by the end of 2018. The security situation 
remained volatile hindering not only political processes but also the country’s econom-
ic growth. Civilian casualties caused by anti-government forces remained almost at 
the same levels of 2017. On the external front, the last 12 months saw both a political 
and military shift in the US’s approach to the country, partly departing from the pre-
viously announced South Asia strategy. 2018 also signalled an increase in China’s 
engagement in Afghanistan, as well as the reiteration of the troubled relationship 
between Kabul and Islamabad.
1. Introduction
Two developments garnered the attention of local and international 
observers during the year under examination in this article. Domestically, 
Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections, the third after the ousting of the 
Taliban regime in 2001, saw 4 million Afghan voters casting their ballot, 
Taliban threats and intimidations notwithstanding. In his address to the 
nation, Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghanī Ahmadzai (hereafter 
indicated as Ashraf Ghani) said that «you [the Afghan people] sent a clear 
message to the world that you do not want violence, you demonstrated 
your determination through democracy. You proved to the Taliban that 
this nation will not surrender to anyone».1 As some observers opined, the 
elections represented «a unique opportunity to conduct a credible and 
inclusive election and structurally entrench democratic institutions in Af-
ghanistan».2 Internationally, the United States remained the key actor in 
defining the present and future of Afghanistan, through engaging in ne-
gotiations with the Taliban and by announcing its intention to halve the 
1.  ‘Ghani Thanks The Nation For Successful Elections’, Tolo News, 21 October 
2018. 
2.  Rafi Fazil, ‘How Afghanistan’s Next Elections Can Succeed’, The Diplomat, 7 
June 2018. 
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troops stationed in the country over the course of 2019. At the same time, 
Pakistan and China have continued to play an important role in shaping 
the Afghan political trajectory, both domestically and regionally. In order 
to dissect these two dimensions, as well as a wider array of domestic and 
international developments which characterized Afghanistan in 2018, this 
article proceeds as follows: section 2 focuses on domestic political devel-
opments, in particular the electoral context which characterized much of 
the political debate during the year under examination; section 3 moves 
to assessing the international politics of Afghanistan, with particular at-
tention being paid to the role of the United States, Pakistan and China; 
section 4 concludes with an assessment of the socio-economic indicators 
and performance of Afghanistan in 2018; finally, the conclusions will be 
drawn in Section 5. 
2. Afghanistan’s 2018 parliamentary elections: amid hope and chaos 
In late October 2018, Afghans went to the polls for the Wolesi Jir-
ga (the lower house of Afghanistan’s bicameral system) elections, in what 
was the third parliamentary election of the post-Taliban era in Afghanistan. 
More than 2,500 candidates – including 400 women – competed for 249 
seats, of which 68 were reserved for women, ten for Kuchis and one for the 
Hindu and Sikh communities.3 Elections were held in 33 of the 34 provinc-
es, with the exception of Ghazni in which parliamentary elections will be 
held at the same time as the presidential ones. In Kandahar, elections were 
delayed following a Taliban attack which killed Kandahar’s police chief, 
General Abdul Raziq, only two days before the elections.4 Continuity, rather 
than change, characterized the run up to the 2018 parliamentary elections. 
Most of the issues that marred the 2014 presidential elections, which result-
ed in the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG), were still 
present in 2018. These included: (a) the lack of electoral reform, especially 
regarding the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV); (b) the Independent 
Electoral Commission’s (IEC) inability to operate aloof of government in-
terference and voter registration; (c) insecurity and the role of the Taliban in 
the Afghan political scenario. The ensuing parts of this section will dissect 
each of these issues. 
3.  Jelena Bjelica & Rohullah Sorush, ‘Afghanistan Elections Conundrum (20): 
Women candidates going against the grain’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 19 October 
2018. 
4.  ‘Afghans Vote In Kandahar Elections Delayed By Violence’, Radio Free Eu-
rope, 27 October 2018. For an assessment of the implications of this attack, see: ‘Kan-
dahar Assassinations Show Rising Taliban Strength in Afghanistan’, International Cri-
sis Group, 19 October 2018. 
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2.1. «Everything must change, for everything to stay the same»: The failure to 
reform the electoral system
The slogans of Afghan political parties invoking «Taghir» (change) in 
the run up to the 2018 elections were similar to those used by presidential 
candidates in the 2014 electoral round.5 While political parties and can-
didates used «change» as an appealing idea to attract voters, the Afghan 
political system fell short of providing the much needed reforms that were 
promised in the previous presidential elections. The single non-transfera-
ble vote was largely regarded as one of the main reasons behind the lack 
of development of political parties within the country. To understand the 
continuity between 2014 and 2018, and for comparative purposes, a brief 
contextualization of the election reform issue is in order. When forming the 
NUG following the presidential elections in 2014, both President Ashraf 
Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah agreed to implement electoral reforms 
and, to this end, a presidential decree established the Special Electoral 
Reform Commission (SERC), with the task of devising the reform to the 
electoral system that the NUG agreement promised.6 Two batches of rec-
ommended reforms were prepared by SERC, and a unanimous consensus 
was reached among SERC members that the Single Non Transferable Vote 
system needed to be changed. To this end, the leaders of 21 Afghan polit-
ical parties organized a conference in Kabul in February 2018 to demand 
change to the electoral system, in order to allow political parties to have 
more weight in the October 2018 parliamentary elections.7 What the parties 
demanding change were proposing as an alternative was Multi-Dimensional 
Representation (MDR), a system entailing that a proportion of seats (100 
out of 249 according to a 2015 proposal) would be reserved for political 
parties, while the remainder would be «open» or «at-large» seats within mul-
ti-member constituencies, thereby permitting individuals to contest.8 Due 
to time constraints, and the difficulty of reaching a compromise on such a 
thorny issue, the electoral system did not change and it was left to the next 
parliament to address this key issue in a more comprehensive way.9 
5.  Thomas Ruttig, ‘Afghanistan Election Conundrum (19): A young «wave of 
change» for the Wolesi Jirga?’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 18 October 2018. 
6.  Ali Yawar Adili, ‘Afghanistan Election Conundrum (5): A late demand to 
change the electoral system’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 8 March 2018.
7.  Ibid.
8.  ‘Report On November 2016 Mission To Afghanistan’, National Democratic 
Institute and the United States Institute for Peace, 10 November 2016. See also: ‘Reform 
panel wants 100 parliament seats given to parties’, Pajhwok News, 29 August 2015.
9.  Ali Yawar Adili, ‘Thematic Dossier (XX): Electoral reform and the prepara-
tions for the 2018 elections’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 10 August 2018. 
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2.2. The Independent Election Commission and voters ID 
In addition to the lack of electoral system reforms, there were a host 
of issues which affected the run up to the elections, ranging from govern-
ment interference in the affairs of the election commission, to the registra-
tion of voters in the elections. In relation to the first point, the IEC lament-
ed the government’s interference in the internal matters of the commission, 
following a controversial proposal by President Ashraf Ghani to put the 
voter registration stickers on copies of national identity cards. According to 
Naeem Ayubzada, CEO of Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan, 
«the government’s interference in the (election) commission and the inter-
nal problems between members of the institution will lead the election to a 
crisis».10 While the crisis did not de facto materialize, voter registration was 
another issue which characterized much of the preparations for the 2018 
elections, right up to the days immediately preceding the vote.11 In some 
provinces, for instance, the number of the eligible voting population was 
lower than the number already registered. After protests from political par-
ties threatening to boycott the elections if the issue were not resolved, one 
month before the election the IEC decided to procure, ship and distribute 
22,000 biometric devices to verify the identity of voters on election day.12
2.3. Insecurity and government-Taliban relations
Civilian casualties and absence of human security were a defining fea-
ture of Afghanistan throughout 2018 (on this more in section 3). Around the 
election period though, violence intensified. In the months preceding the 
elections, the Taliban had been threatening Afghan citizens that they would 
retaliate against those who decided to cast their ballot. In the words of a Tal-
iban commander quoted by Reuters, «burning a house is a small punishment 
if they [Afghan citizens] are caught in supporting this U.S. operation [the 
elections] to prolong their stay in Afghanistan».13 According to the findings 
10.  ‘Watchdogs Warn Govt Against Interfering In Elections’, Tolo News, 16 May 
2018.
11.  In Spring 2018, there was also a row over the inclusion of the word «Af-
ghan» in the new IDs. Just hours after President Ghani and First Lady Rula Ghani 
were given their cards on 3 May 2018, Chief Executive Abdullah held a press confer-
ence saying that the electronic ID card system was not legitimate and did not have 
the support of the Afghan people. See: ‘CEO Slams ID Card Process, Says It Is Not 
«Legitimate»’, Tolo News, 3 May 2018. For an in-depth discussion of the ‘E-Tazkera 
row’, see: Jelena Bjelica & Ali Yawar Adili, ‘The E-Tazkera Rift: Yet another political 
crisis looming?’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 22 February 2018.
12.  Ali Yawar Adili, ‘Afghanistan Elections Conundrum (21): Biometric verifi-
cation likely to spawn host of new problems’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 19 October 
2018. 
13.  Matin Sahak, ‘«If we vote, we’ll be killed» - Afghan villages face election 
threat’, Reuters, 28 April 2018. 
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of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), over 
the three voting days for the parliamentary elections, 435 civilian casualties 
(56 deaths and 379 injured) in 108 verified incidents of election-related 
violence were registered.14 This was the highest level of civilian harm com-
pared to previous elections held in Afghanistan. To prevent this, the Afghan 
government did try to reach out to the Taliban multiple times through-
out 2018. In February, President Ghani offered direct talks with the Taliban 
«without preconditions», an offer which was rejected by the Taliban leader-
ship.15 A few months later, in June, Ghani declared a unilateral, nationwide 
ceasefire, which was unexpectedly reciprocated by the Taliban, leading to 
a three-day ceasefire. In this period, overlapping with Eid-al-Fitr, Afghan 
forces and Taliban fighters prayed together and visited areas controlled by 
the other.16 However, «the Taliban effectively rejected a second, conditional 
three-month ceasefire offered by the Afghan government in August 2018» 
and the attack on Kandahar’s police chief in October 2018 not only cast 
a shadow on the electoral process, but also represented a step back in the 
reconciliation process.17 
To add another layer of complexity to the situation, domestic frag-
mentation along ethnic lines was a key area in the run up to elections. The 
return to the country in July 2018 of the vice president of Afghanistan, Gen-
eral Abdul Rashid Dostum, after one year of self-imposed exile in Turkey, 
is a case in point.18 It signified on the one hand the government’s weakness 
in dealing with the country’s warlords, while on the other, its attempt to 
ease tensions in Afghanistan’s Northern areas, where General Dostum still 
enjoyed large support among the Uzbeks residing there.19 
2.4. The elections and their aftermath
The aftermath of the elections was characterized by the severe delays 
in announcing the election results. As at the end of December 2018, the 
IEC had announced the preliminary results for 30 out of 33 provinces al-
though, according to the election timeline, it was due to announce the pre-
14.   ‘Quarterly Report On The Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict: 1 
January to 30 September 2018’, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, 10 
October 2018, p. 1.
15.  Ibid.
16.  Ibid.
17.  Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy’, Congressional 
Research Service, 12 December 2018. 
18. Ahmad Mohibi ‘Afghanistan: A Game of Thrones’, The Diplomat, 24 July 
2018.
19.  Waslat Hasrat-Nazimi, ‘«Warlord» Afghan vice president returns from exile 
to ease political tension’, Deutsche Welle, 23 July 2018. 
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liminary results on 10 November and the final results on 11 December.20 Be-
sides undermining the credibility of the IEC in the eyes of the population, 
such a delay raised concerns within the Afghan political parties about the 
IEC’s ability to hold the presidential elections, originally scheduled in April 
2019. After weeks of speculation21 regarding a potential postponement of 
the presidential elections, at the end of 2018 the IEC’s chairman, Abdul 
Badi Sayyad, announced that the presidential elections would be postponed 
from the previous provisional date of 20 April.22 The reasons behind such 
a postponement were two-fold: first, delaying an all-important presidential 
election would buy the IEC some time to prepare for the elections and avoid 
repeating the same mistakes which occurred in the parliamentary electoral 
round. According to Asadullah Sadati, a member of the opposition Wahdat 
party, «the parliamentary election was a mess. It was not fair and transpar-
ent. We think the postponement brings more time for the election com-
mission to prepare».23 Second, with the ongoing negotiations between the 
United States and the Taliban, it was important for the Afghan leadership to 
be able to seize any potential opportunity stemming from such peace nego-
tiations without being in the middle of an all-important election campaign. 
The role of the US in Afghanistan, as well as the wider regional dynamics 
involving Pakistan and China, will be the focus of the next section.
3. The international politics of Afghanistan in 2018 
During the course of 2018, there has been a growing realization, 
among both regional and international actors, that stability in Afghanistan 
is a determining factor in the regional policies pursued by major players. 
On the one hand, China sees Afghanistan as an important component of 
the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing places Kabul into the wider develop-
ment-stability nexus strategy, which will be discussed in the ensuing sections 
of this article. On the other hand, India has been vying to extend its influ-
ence in Afghanistan to bypass Pakistan for access to Central Asia. India’s 
stakes in Afghanistan have grown over the last year with the development of 
the port of Chahbahar in Iran, as a competitor to the Pakistani ports of Ka-
rachi and Gwadar. For Afghanistan, the development of Chahbahar would 
provide an alternative to the reliance on Karachi as the major access-point 
to the Indian Ocean. In addition to Indian and Chinese interests in the 
20.  ‘IEC Criticized For Delay In Announcing Election Results’, Tolo News, 28 
December 2018. 
21.  See: Rod Nordland and Fatima Faizi, ‘Afghanistan Considers Delaying Pres-
idential Election’, The New York Times, 25 November 2018. 
22.  ‘New Date Set For Presidential Elections’, Tolo News, 30 December 2018. 
23.  Mujib Mashal & Fatima Faizi, ‘Afghanistan Likely to Delay Election as 
Trump Presses for Peace Talks’, The New York Times, 26 December 2018.
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country, the United States, Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, all have 
some degree of interest in Afghanistan. Russia, in particular, has demon-
strated a growing and renewed interest in the Afghan scenario, nearly 30 
years after its defeat and troop withdrawal in February 1989. To be sure, 
Russia’s interests in the country are driven in part by the threat posed by 
the Islamic State in Afghanistan, and in part by the desire to be seen as a 
mediator in the peace process, a role that both Pakistan and China support. 
Since 2016, Russia has been willing to host meetings aimed at jumpstarting 
peace talks, but it was only during the year under examination that the 
Taliban accepted Moscow’s invitation to attend an international meeting 
on Afghanistan, held in the Russian capital in November 2018. Important-
ly, both Taliban representatives and members of Afghanistan’s High Peace 
Council were present, but not representatives of the Afghan government.24 
While no major breakthrough was achieved, it signalled Russia’s increasing-
ly important role as a stakeholder in shaping the future of Afghanistan. As a 
seasoned observer of Afghan developments Barnett Rubin opined, regional 
countries might have come to realize that the threat posed by Afghanistan’s 
dependence on the United States lies in the fact that the «United States will 
inevitably tire of the effort to maintain stability in Afghanistan and with-
draw, leaving the region with a challenge it is ill prepared to face».25 
While it is important to acknowledge Russia’s proactive role in Af-
ghanistan, as well as Iran’s growing ties with the Taliban as an anti-America 
move which could potentially give Teheran an edge in a post-US Afghan-
istan,26 in the ensuing sections the discussion focuses on three main coun-
tries, the United States, Pakistan and China, as these were the most promi-
nent actors in Afghanistan’s international relations during 2018. 
3.1. The United States in Afghanistan
In a shift from the previous policy outlined by President Donald 
Trump in August 2017, the US approach to Afghanistan has developed into 
a two-pronged strategy, aimed at engaging the Taliban leadership on a po-
litical front, and withdrawing Afghan and US military forces to consolidate 
urban areas.27 
24.  ‘Afghanistan war: Taliban attend landmark peace talks in Russia’, BBC 
News, 9 November 2018. 
25.  Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Is Afghanistan Ready for Peace?’, Foreign Affairs, 30 July 
2018.
26.  For an assessment of Russia’s interests see: ‘Why Russia and China Are Ex-
panding Their Roles in Afghanistan’, Stratfor, 5 September 2018; for an overview of 
Iran’s growing ties with the Taleban, see: Michael Kugelman, ‘Shutting Out Iran Will 
Make the Afghan War Even Deadlier’, Foreign Policy, 16 November 2018.
27.  For an assessment of President Trump’s South Asia Strategy, see: Diego 
Abenante, ‘Afghanistan 2017: Trump’s «New Strategy», the Af-Pak conundrum, and 
the crisis of the National Unity Government’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 369-386. 
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From a military standpoint, the Trump administration has urged Af-
ghan troops to retreat from sparsely populated areas of the country.28 This 
was aimed at protecting Afghan forces from being attacked in isolated and 
rural areas, and to ensure that the government and the Afghan Nation-
al Army (ANA) control Kabul and major urban centres such as Kandahar, 
Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz.29 While it is too early to assess such 
a strategy, according to the latest available data produced by the Special In-
spector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the district con-
trol in the country, as of July 2018, was as follows: 56% of Afghan land was 
under government control; 32% contested between the government and 
anti-government forces; and 12% (down from 13% in August 2017) was con-
trolled by the insurgents.30
Another important development which is worth noting is the Trump 
administration’s decision in the last days of December 2018 to withdraw 
some 7,000 troops from the Afghan theatre. The decision came at the same 
time as President Trump’s announced withdrawal from Syria, prompting 
the resignation of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.31 While some saw this 
as a move to detach Afghan forces from Western support and therefore 
boost their independence, there were also concerns that such a move could 
have potentially undermined the already weak Afghan troops, which had 
suffered significant losses against the insurgents, even with high levels of 
American and NATO support.32 
Politically, the US’s shift was all the more important since it moved the 
focus away from the «Afghan-led, Afghan owned» mantra which character-
ized the American approach to the Afghan peace process.33 Most of the em-
phasis in previous attempts was to bring around the negotiating table both 
the Afghan government and the Taliban. The latter has always opposed 
such a scenario, holding the line that they would only engage in peace ne-
gotiations with the Americans, since they were the ones who toppled the 
Taliban regime in 2001. Against this backdrop, since July 2018, when the 
revised approach was being implemented, three rounds of talks between 
Americans and the Taliban took place. The first was in late July 2018, when 
American representatives met with the Taliban leadership in Doha, Qatar, 
where the Taliban had established an informal political office. While previ-
ous efforts of this kind had failed because the Afghan government was not 
28.  Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Helene Cooper, ‘Newest U.S. Strategy in Afghan-
istan Mirrors Past Plans for Retreat’, The New York Times, 28 July 2018.
29.  Ibid.
30.  Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Quarterly Re-
port To The United States Congress’, 30 October 2018. 
31.  ‘U.S. to Withdraw About 7,000 Troops From Afghanistan, Officials Say’, The 
New York Times, 20 December 2018.
32.  Ibid.
33.  Mujib Mashal & Eric Schmitt, ‘White House Orders Direct Taliban Talks to 
Jump-Start Afghan Negotiations’, The New York Times, July 15, 2018.
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on board and denounced such talks, the Afghan government commented 
that they «appreciate help and support from any side that can facilitate the 
peace process».34 The second meeting between American Diplomats and 
Taliban representatives occurred in mid-October, just days before the par-
liamentary elections.35 The October meeting was important for two reasons: 
first, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, Zalmay Khalilzad, the former 
U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan nominated by secretary of state Mike Pom-
peo in September 2018 as special adviser on Afghanistan, stopped in Saudi 
Arabia to meet with the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi 
Arabia’s Afghanistan policy has been a careful balance of standing behind 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban on the one hand, while on the other offi-
cially supporting the American and Afghan governments’ efforts to achieve 
a peaceful solution.36 Second, in the wake of the meeting, Afghan president 
Ghani «expressed concern and resistance to American officials about the 
prospect of talks that did not include his government» on the grounds that 
by excluding the Afghan government, this would only marginalize the coun-
try’s leadership.37 The third meeting of 2018 occurred on 17 December in 
the United Arab Emirates and saw the participation of a number of coun-
tries, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  
According to Afghan officials, Taliban leaders based in Pakistan were 
part of this third round of talks, which can be interpreted as a sign that Pa-
kistan might be using its leverage on the group to bring it to the negotiating 
table.38 
3.2. Limited progress in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations
On 1 January 2018, President Donald Trump said on social media 
that «the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion 
dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but 
lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the 
terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!».39 This was 
echoed by Afghan president Ghani, who said in February 2018 that Pakistan 
34.  Taimoor Shah & Rod Nordland, ‘U.S. Diplomats Held Face-to-Face Talks 
With Taliban, Insurgents Say’, The New York Times, 28 July 2018.
35.  Mujib Mashal, ‘U.S. Officials Meet With Taliban Again as Trump Pushes 
Afghan Peace Process’, The New York Times, 13 October 2018.
36.  According to The New York Times, a former Taliban finance minister de-
scribed how he travelled to Saudi Arabia for years raising cash while ostensibly on 
pilgrimage. See: Carlotta Gall, ‘Saudis Bankroll Taliban, Even as King Officially Sup-
ports Afghan Government’, The New York Times, 6 December 2016. 
37.  Mujib Mashal, ‘Afghan Leader Blindsided’ by U.S. Meeting With Taliban, 
Officials Say’, The New York Times, 18 October 2018. 
38.  Mujib Mashal, ‘Taliban Appear Ready to Discuss Peace Talks, Except With 
Afghan Officials’, The New York Times, 17 December 2018. 
39.  Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, 1 January 2018 (https://twitter.com/realdon-
aldtrump/status/947802588174577664). 
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was «the center of the Taliban».40 These allegations stem from the fact that 
since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, Afghan insurgents have operated 
from safe havens within Pakistan. Pakistan’s leverage on the Taliban was also 
very visible in 2018, with Islamabad allegedly playing a role in reaching a 
ceasefire during Eid-al-Fitr.
 According to Pakistani officials quoted in the Pakistani Newspaper 
Express Tribune, «the Taliban agreed to the proposal only if China and Pa-
kistan become guarantors», with Pakistan acting as a facilitator and China 
mediating between the Taliban and the Afghan government.41 To under-
stand and contextualize these dynamics, it is important to examine the key 
motives of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, whose roots are grounded in the coun-
try’s history. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan are best characterized by 
mutual distrust. There are four major determinants behind this policy.  
First, the legacy of the British Raj’s policy towards Afghanistan pro-
vided a blueprint for Pakistan’s relations with the country. The British pol-
icy consisted primarily of keeping Afghanistan under its direct influence 
through interference in the country’s internal affairs, including the instal-
lation of a friendly ruler.42 This is an approach that the Pakistani estab-
lishment has repeatedly used to ensure that it could, to a certain extent, 
maintain its influence in the neighbouring country. 
Second, the competition over influence in Afghanistan, coupled with 
the Pakistani establishment’s fear of a pro-India government being installed 
in Kabul has represented an important determinant of Pakistan’s Afghan 
policy. In Pakistan’s narrative, India is not only using its presence to ex-
pand its influence in Afghanistan, but also to fuel tensions in Pakistan’s 
Balochistan, where the China-managed port of Gwadar, the starting point 
of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is located.43
Third, besides the India factor, another element of concern of the Pa-
kistani leadership has been the so-called Pashtun question, which emerged 
in 1947 following a referendum held in the North West Frontier Province 
(now renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), inviting the Pashtuns to join India or 
40.  ‘Pakistan Is The Center Of Taliban, Ghani Tells The Nation’, Tolo News, 8 
February 2018. 
41.  Kamran Yousaf, ‘Afghan Eid truce backed by Pakistan, China’, The Express 
Tribune, 11 June 2018. For an assessment of China’s increasing role as a mediator in 
the Afghan conflict, see: Miwa Hirono, ‘China’s Conflict Mediation and the Dura-
bility of the Principle of Non Interference: The Case of Post-2014 Afghanistan’, The 
China Quarterly, 2018, 2, pp. 1468-2648.
42.  Rasul Bux Rais, State, Society, and Democratic Change in Pakistan, New York: 
OUP, p. 71.
43.  For an analysis of the evolution of the port of Gwadar against the backdrop 
of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies, see: Filippo Boni, ‘Civil-military relations 
in Pakistan: a case study of Sino-Pakistani relations and the port of Gwadar’, Common-
wealth and Comparative Politics, 2016, Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 498-517.
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Pakistan. The vote was overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan.44 Afghanistan, 
for its part, has always claimed that the referendum was a unilateral step 
taken without Afghan consultation or consent.45 
The fourth element which must be considered is the fact that Pakistan 
considers Afghanistan as the bridge to the commercial and energy markets 
represented by the Central Asian Republics (CARs).46 After the announce-
ment of the CPEC, Pakistan has tried to revitalize its relations with CARs, 
in particular with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The latter represents an 
important player in Pakistan’s economic outreach to the region since it 
would be the starting point of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-In-
dia (TAPI) pipeline. The latter, connecting the energy-rich Central Asian 
nation with the South Asian countries, was inaugurated in February 2018, 
with leaders of the four countries attending its ground breaking ceremony 
in Serhetabat, followed by another in Herat.47
This cursory overview of the rationale behind Pakistan’s Afghan pol-
icy can help us understand the dynamics which defined the year under ex-
amination. After a capricious start, exemplified by the two quotes at the 
beginning of this section, in order to try and normalize relations between 
the two countries, Islamabad and Kabul initiated a process in February 2018 
to agree on the Afghanistan Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity, 
covering the areas of military cooperation, counter-terrorism and intelli-
gence sharing, economy, trade and transit, and refugee repatriation.48 After 
several rounds of talks, taking place between February and mid-May 2018, 
the two sides finalized an agreement on the action plan on 14 May in Is-
lamabad.49 
In the attempt to continue to diffuse tensions between the two coun-
tries, several additional developments occurred. First, after being elected 
as prime minister, Imran Khan immediately referred to Afghanistan as one 
of his top foreign policy priorities. In his victory speech in the immediate 
aftermath of the election, Pakistan’s new prime minister said that Pakistan 
would make all efforts to bring an end to the conflict in Afghanistan.50 In 
his words, ‘if there is peace in Afghanistan, there will be peace in Pakistan. 
We will make every effort to achieve peace there. We want to have open 
44.  Christophe Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox, London: Hurst & Co., p. 153.
45.  Frédéric Grare, ‘Pakistan Afghanistan Relations In The Post-9/11 Era’, Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace, 29 September 2006.
46.  C. Christine Fair, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?’, 
Central Asian Survey, 2008, 31 (2), pp. 201-227. 
47.  ‘Bonhomie marks opening of TAPI gas pipeline’, Dawn, 24 February 2018.
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borders with Afghanistan one day.’51 In September 2018, Pakistan’s min-
ister for foreign affairs, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, made his first official 
foreign visit after taking office to Afghanistan. During this visit, he met 
with President Ghani, chief executive Abdullah and minister for foreign 
affairs Salahuddin Rabbani. The fact that the new foreign minister decided 
to undertake his first overseas visit to Afghanistan was largely regarded as 
a signal of the importance that Afghanistan will play in the new adminis-
tration’s foreign policy. 
How far these attempts at mending fences will go remains to be seen. 
After all, civilian control over Pakistan’s Afghan policy has been extremely 
limited, given that the military has always seen this as one of its key poli-
cy prerogatives. The backlash from politicians and supporters of the army, 
opposed to Imran Khan’s promise to grant citizenship to the children of 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, is a case in point. The military’s stance 
on this issue – to repatriate refugees accused of carrying out terrorist acts 
within Pakistan – is in contrast with the prime minister’s pledge; something 
which may need to be reconsidered in order not to interfere in the reserved 
domain of the military.52 In addition to this, a number of episodes which 
occurred during the second half of 2018 suggest that the path towards nor-
malized relations along the two sides of the Durand Line remains difficult. 
First, on 22 October, President Ghani publicly stated that the assassination 
of the Kandahar chief of police had been planned in Pakistan.53 The alle-
gation prompted a strong response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Pakistan, which rejected the claims and called on Afghan officials to channel 
discussions of security concerns through the mechanism established earli-
er that year.54 Alongside these developments, Pakistan’s decision to build a 
fence along the Durand Line coupled with cross-border shelling, are also 
creating tensions in the relationship. In particular, the fencing of the border 
was initiated in 2017 and, according to the Inter-Services Public Relations 
(ISPR), the army’s media wing, is due to be completed by the end of 2019.55 
While Pakistan believes that the fencing will prevent terrorist infiltration 
in both directions, Afghanistan opposes Pakistan’s unilateral move on the 
grounds that the fence goes along a border that Afghanistan does not rec-
ognize, as well as hindering trade prospects between the two countries.56 
51.  Ibid.
52.  ‘Pakistan’s Imran Khan skirts issue of Afghan refugees’ citizenship’, The 
Guardian, 18 September 2018. 
53.  ‘Raziq’s Assassination Was Plotted in Pakistan: Ghani’, Tolo News, 23 Octo-
ber 2018. 
54.  ‘Pakistan Rejects Afghan Claim Of Involvement In Kandahar Attack’, Rferl.
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3.3. China and Afghanistan in 2018
China’s approach to Afghanistan in 2018 is very similar to that of the 
previous year and is primarily driven by China’s national security interests 
to stabilize Xinjiang, as well as by Beijing’s desire to push ahead with the 
development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Eco-
nomic Corridor. All of this with an eye on how the US’ announced with-
drawal will unfold over the course of the coming months. The year 2018 saw 
an increase in China’s engagement with Afghanistan, which is part of the 
wider shift towards a more proactive role that Beijing has sought to take in 
the Afghan scenario since 2014. To be clear, China has no intention of sup-
planting NATO or the United States. Instead, it has adopted a more multi-
lateral approach to Afghanistan, in order to bring around the same table a 
number of actors with interests and stakes in the present and future political 
developments in the country. By acting as a «primus inter pares», China has 
engaged with a number of regional organizations and mechanisms (e.g. the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Heart of Asia Process) in order 
to promote Afghan developments as well as encourage different actors to 
play a role in Afghanistan.57 Further evidence of this is the establishment 
of the Quadrilateral Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism (QCCM) 
which gathers together the chiefs of army staff for China, Afghanistan, Ta-
jikistan and Pakistan, with a focus on the Wakhan Corridor which they all 
share, and is at the core of China’s interests.58
China’s national security interests have revolved primarily around 
the stabilization of its western periphery and the prevention of the spread 
of terrorism to its westernmost region, Xinjiang.59 As a Chinese scholar 
noted in Asian Survey in 2018, «the security situation in Afghanistan has 
an important impact on China’s western border region».60 The centrality 
of Afghanistan in China’s calculations was exemplified by reports that ap-
peared at the end of 2017 about China’s plans to build a military base in 
Afghanistan’s North-Eastern province of Badakhshan. While some reports 
quoted Afghan Defence officials providing details of the base, in August 
2018 China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, denied any 
such development.61 Regardless, the Badakhshan area and the Wakhan 
corridor represent an important area for China’s internal stability. Beijing 
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has been concerned for quite some time about Uighur fighters using the 
corridor to return from Syria and Iraq and see this as a direct threat to its 
own domestic stability.62
Afghanistan is becoming increasingly important for China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative. Although originally excluded from official BRI maps, now 
Afghanistan features prominently in most official documents related to the 
BRI. Kabul has been keen to be part of the initiative. Officials in the Af-
ghan Ministry of Economy said that the project will help improve econom-
ic stability in the country as well as increase the connectivity both within 
Afghanistan and with regional countries. According to Suhrab Bahman, a 
spokesman for the Ministry of Economy, Afghanistan should focus «on is-
sues inside the country. Our railway system should be established».63 
While the economic implications of the initiative are clear, it is also 
important to highlight the role that China intends to play as a mediator be-
tween Pakistan and Afghanistan. As part of China’s wider efforts to improve 
relations between Kabul and Islamabad, at the end of December 2017, the 
first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue was held in 
Beijing. On that occasion, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, noted how the 
three countries «share integrated interests».64 In December 2018, the three 
sides met again, this time in Kabul, and the official communique stated 
that through such a trilateral engagement one of the aims was to enhance 
«the momentum of improvement of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations».65 As 
China’s commitment to the BRI grows, the stability of Afghanistan-Pakistan 
relations becomes an important bridge in the wider regional connectivity as 
a link between CPEC and Central Asian markets.
4. The socio-economic conditions of Afghanistan in 2018
Lack of security is still the major issue hindering any substantive and 
long-lasting progress in Afghanistan’s socio-economic situation. Three main 
aspects are considered here: human security, economic growth and opium 
production. 
Human security in Afghanistan remained rather precarious through-
out 2018. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghani-
stan’s (UNAMA) report, in the period between 1 January and 30 September 
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2018, there were 8,050 civilian casualties (2,798 deaths and 5,252 injured).66 
Of these, anti-government elements caused 5,243 civilian casualties (1,743 
deaths and 3,500 injured), accounting for 65% of all civilian casualties. 
Within this 65%, 35% were attributed to Taliban, 25% to Daesh/ISKP, and 
5% to unidentified anti-government elements.67 Insecurity was not only a 
factor casting a shadow over the electoral process, as previous sections of 
this article have highlighted, but also an important aspect of the country 
that has hindered its economic growth throughout 2018. According to the 
Asian Development Bank, «drought and scant improvement in security ap-
pears to hold growth in Afghanistan» thereby revising the growth forecast 
from 2.5 to 2.2 in the year under examination.68 More positive signs came 
from exports and the inflation rate. Exports reportedly increased in the first 
half of the year, benefitting from expanded air connections with India for 
high-value goods such as fruit.69 Low inflation was also an important devel-
opment in 2018 and this drop from 5% in 2017 to 3.5% in 2018 has been 
driven by declining food prices.70
According to the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) 2016-
2017, a report jointly produced by Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Organi-
sation and the European Union, published in May 2018, the proportion of 
the population living below the national poverty line increased from 34% 
in 2007-2008 to 55% in 2016-2017. In addition to this significant increase 
in the poverty rate, other socio-economic issues were identified in the coun-
try’s demographics – with nearly 48% of Afghanistan’s population under 
15 – and in the precarious security situation in parts of the country.71 This 
was also one of the key findings of the Asia Foundation’s annual survey 
in Afghanistan. According to the survey, fear for personal safety remained 
roughly at the same level as 2017 (70.7% in 2017 and 71.1% in 2018) there-
by reflecting the «public’s continued concern for personal safety».72
One additional aspect that is important to consider in this brief over-
view of the socio-economic situation of Afghanistan in 2018, is the state of 
narcotics production during the course of the last 12 months, in particular 
opium. According to the latest Afghanistan Opium Survey, an annual report 
produced by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) of Afghanistan in 
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collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO-
DC), the area in which opium poppy cultivation is present in Afghanistan 
«remains at very high levels despite a decrease by 20 per cent compared 
to 2017».73 While the production of opium decreased by 29% in 2018, the 
report also highlights that this was primarily due to drought affecting the 
Northern and Western areas of the country, rather than an improvement of 
the rule of law in these areas.74 As such, the progress made in this area might 
not necessarily translate into long-term, consolidated gains. 
5. Conclusion
The political and economic situation in Afghanistan in 2018 resem-
bled that of the previous year. The National Unity government, sworn in 
after the 2014 presidential elections with a mandate to deliver much needed 
reforms, failed in this respect and continued to lack unity. While the parlia-
mentary elections represented an important moment for Afghanistan’s de-
mocracy, the delay in announcing the results, and the consequent postpone-
ment of the 2019 presidential elections, have undermined the credibility 
of the whole democratic exercise. Afghanistan’s regional and international 
environment remained in flux, with a host of actors ranging from the US to 
China, aiming to maximize their interests in the country. 
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